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Substantive irrationality in cognitive systems
Pierre Bisquert1 and Madalina Croitoru2 and Florence Dupin de Saint-Cyr3 and Abdelraouf Hecham2
Abstract. In this paper we approach both procedural and substan-
tive irrationality of artificial agent cognitive systems and consider
that when it is not possible for an agent to make a logical inference
(too expensive cognitive effort or not enough knowledge) she might
replace certain parts of the logical reasoning with mere associations.
1 INTRODUCTION
In artificial agents two kinds of biases have been highlighted ( [8],
[12], [14]). On one hand, the agent’s beliefs and preferences may
be incomplete and the agent may not know all the preferences or
beliefs needed for complete reasoning (e.g. the agent’s utility func-
tion is not available, or some constraints about the real world are not
known). This kind of representational issued biases refers to the so
called Type 1 irrationality or substantive irrationality that concerns
the compliance of the results of reasoning with the agent’s explicit
goals and beliefs. For instance, a substantive irrational agent may eat
fat while its rational goals and beliefs are in favor of healthy food.
Type 2 irrationality, also known as procedural irrationality, concerns
with the case when, due to the fact that computational resources (time
or space available for representing and reasoning) are limited, the
agent needs to make good choices in the process of deciding how
to apply its efforts in reasoning. In this case what is rational for one
agent is not rational for another with different limitations. Achiev-
ing procedural rationality means making rational choices about what
inferences to perform, how to apply them, basically thinking about
how to think. We investigate both substantive and procedural irra-
tionality and build upon the model proposed in [4, 3]. We propose
a more natural transition between two systems of reasoning: a logic
based and an association based ones and propose a first cognitive
model for substantive and procedural irrational agents that accounts
for utterance acceptance in a logic encoding beliefs and preferences.
2 AGENT COGNITIVE MODEL
We define the cognitive model of an agent to contain beliefs, opin-
ions, preferences and associations. The beliefs are represented using
a finite setB of formulas taken from a propositional languageBL. We
define an opinion about a belief ϕ ∈ BL, denoted ϕ (and resp. ϕ)
as a constraint, that imposes to the situations where ϕ holds to be
preferred (resp. strictly preferred) to the situations where ϕ does not
hold, the opinions are gathered in a finite base O ⊂ OL where OL is
the set of opinion formulas (that are either basic opinions or Boolean
combination of them). A basic preference is a formula of the form
α D β (resp. α B β) where α, β ∈ BL, interpreted as constraints on
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the preferences such that the situations where α holds should be pre-
ferred (resp. strictly preferred to) situations where β holds. Associa-
tions (elicited using [13]) encode Kahneman’s System 1 [16], that is
a human reasoning system dealing with quick, instinctive and heuris-
tic thoughts. We denote byA = (BL ∪OL ∪PL)× (BL ∪OL ∪PL)
the set of all possible associations between any pair of formulae. We
also denote BR, PR, OR, AR the sets of inference rules that allow
us to deduce new beliefs, preferences, opinions and associations.
We define the notion of “reasoning” as the process of inferring a
formulaϕ using a rule application sequenceR from the set of logical,
preference, opinion and association rules on an initial set of pieces of
information K, denoted K `R ϕ. We call the successive application
of rulesR a “reasoning path”. Inside this reasoning path we differen-
tiate the use of logical inference rules from the use of an association
rule. A reasoning on a formula can be achieved using different rea-
soning paths, each path has a cost depending on the cognitive effort
needed to use the rules it contains. Intuitively it is less costly to use
association rules than logical inference rules and among associations
some are more or less far-fetched than others. In order to represent
the cognitive effort involved by the reasoning, we are going to use
the effort function e that associates an effort to the associations and
the inference rules used.
A cognitive model is defined as a tuple of beliefs, opinions, pref-
erences, associations and their subsequent effort for reasoning.
Definition 1 (Cognitive model) A cognitive model is a tuple
κ = (B,O, P,A, e,v)
• B ⊆ BL is a set of wff representing beliefs,
• O ⊆ OL is a set of wff representing opinions,
• P ⊆ PL is a set of wff representing preferences,
• A ⊆ A is a binary relation representing the associations between
formulae,
• e is a function BR∪PR∪OR∪AR → N∪{+∞} that represents
the effort required to infer with each inference rule.
• v ⊆ R×R is a preference relation based on e over reasoning
paths; R1 v R2 means R1 is better than R2.
3 Argument Evaluation
In our work, agents reason about implicative utterances [2] and more
generally about enthymemes (see [5, 9]) or arguments.
Definition 2 (Argument) Given L = BL ∪ PL ∪ OL, an argument
arg is a pair (ϕ ∈ L, α ∈ L).
An argument (ϕ, α) intends to state that having some beliefs and
preferences described by ϕ leads to concluding α. In argumentation
literature, some works (such as e.g., [17]) propose to base the deci-
sion about whether or not an argument is acceptable on some critical
questions. For the sake of generality, we propose to base the evalua-
tion of arguments on the classical notions that are used in argumen-
tation in order to explain “attacks” between arguments. Classically
three notions are used, called rebuttal, undermine and undercut. More
precisely an argument (ϕ, α) can be attacked either on its conclusion
(α) directly or on a part of its premises (ϕ) or on the link between
the premises and the conclusion.
• CQ1: (B,O, P,A) ` ¬α (is it possible to attack the conclusion?)
• CQ2: (B,O, P,A) ` ¬ϕ (is it possible to attack the premises?)
• CQ3: ϕ ` α (does the premises allow to infer the conclusion?)
To define what are the answers to critical questions we will use
reasoning paths. Based on the ELM model [6] we suppose here that
each agent has a cognitive availability that represents the maximum
cognitive effort ca she is willing to make in order to reason on an
argument.
Given an argument and a finite cognitive availability ca, we can
compute all the possible reasoning paths wrt ca. A positive answer
to a critical question corresponds to the existence of a reasoning path
that requires a cognitive effort under ca. If there is no such path, the
answer to the critical question is negative.
Definition 3 (Positive/negative answers)
Given an inferenceCQ : h ` c and a cognitive availability ca, given
a reasoning path R, we denote:
proofca(R,CQ)
def
= Eff(R) ≤ ca and h `R c where Eff(R) =∑
r∈R e(r). Moreover, we say that:
• CQ is answered positively wrt to ca iff ∃R s.t. proofca(R,CQ),
denoted positiveca(CQ),
• CQ is answered negatively wrt to ca iff @R s.t. proofca(R,CQ),
denoted negativeca(CQ).
Thanks to the previous definitions, we are in position to formally
define the problem of argument evaluation wrt an agent cognitive
model and its cognitive availability.
Definition 4 (Potential status of arguments) Given an agent with
a cognitive model κ = (B,O, P,A, e,v), a cognitive availability
ca and an argument arg = (ϕ, α). LetCQ1 = B∪O∪P∪A ` ¬α,
CQ2 = B ∪O ∪ P ∪A ` ¬ϕ, CQ3 = ϕ ` α. We say that arg is:
• acceptableca iff ∀c3 ≤ ca s.t. positivec3(CQ3) and ∀(c1, c2)
s.t. c1 + c2 + c3 = ca, we have negativec1(CQ1) and
negativec2(CQ2).• rejectableca iff positiveca(CQ1) or positiveca(CQ2) or
negativeca(CQ3).
• undecidableca if it is both acceptableca and rejectableca.
In other words, an argument is acceptable if the link between the
premises and the conclusion can be established and the agent has
not enough cognitive ability to find a counter-example for either the
conclusion (CQ1) or the premises (CQ2). In order to be able to reject
an argument it is enough to find a counterexample corresponding
to one of the two first critical questions or to not have a sufficient
cognitive ability to infer the causal link. An undecidable argument
may be found if there is a proof for CQ3 and for CQ1 with a total
cost above ca.
4 DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
The highly influential cognitive psychology work in dual systems
([16, 7, 11, 1, 10, 15]) associate such biases with two reasoning sys-
tems: one system that is slow but logically precise and another system
that is fast but logically sloppy. The distinction does not make clear
the interaction between biases due to logically flawed reasoning and
biases due to sub optimal reasoning choices done because of cogni-
tive limitations. This distinction is interesting when addressing the
evaluation of biased argument.
In this paper we consider the problem of argument evaluation
by agents that are both logically biased (i.e. may either reason ex-
clusively logically or by combining logical reasoning with asso-
ciations) and that have a limited cognitive availability. Following
the highly influential cognitive psychology work in dual systems
([16, 7, 11, 1, 10, 15]) proposal considers that, when it is not pos-
sible for an agent to make a logical inference (too expensive cogni-
tive effort or not enough knowledge), she might replace certain parts
of the logical reasoning with mere associations. Using associations
may lower the reasoning effort needed for argument evaluation and
subsequently affect the argument acceptance.
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